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BEYOND THE STRIKE:
A PROPOSAL FOR EXPERIMENTATION WITH SUBSTITUTES
MERTON C. BERNSTEIN*
To many, unions and collective bargaining mean strikes, and that's all
there is to it. To some others, notably legislators, the seemingly inevitable
link can be severed effectively in public employment by a legal ban on the
strike. Paradoxically, both views may be wrong.
Substitutes for the strike may be developed which perform its salutory
functions of making both sides bargain responsibly without imposing the
heavy costs it often inflicts upon participants and the public. The wide-
spread unacceptability of the strike, for reasons both good and bad,' make
the active search for such substitutes eminently worthwhile.
I. FUNCTIONS OF THE STRIKE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
In the United States public labor policy makes collective bargaining the
preferred method for resolving disputes between employers and organized
groups of employees over wages, hours and working conditions. Federal
law and some state statutes require such bargaining in the private sector
when a majority of employees in an appropriate unit select an organization
to represent them. Although the law compels bargaining, democratic and
libertarian notions underlie the requirement-for example, parties most di-
rectly affected know their problems and needs best and can resolve their
differences to their mutual satisfaction and achieve stable accommodations
better than solutions imposed by necessarily more remote officials. Once
parties are compelled to meet and bargain, their exchange of information
and argument is expected to achieve agreement. In part, that outcome re-
sults from the difficulty of arbitrary decision in face to face discussion and
in the presence of data and logic. And those of us who participate or ob-
serve the process testify that bargaining frequently works that way. In
part collective bargaining success may derive from the legal requirement
to bargain in good faith. But few would dispute that most often bar-
gainers act fairly reasonably because the alternative to responsive and re-
sponsible bargaining in much of the private sector is the strike.
Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law.
'For example, private employees' strikes cost employers money because of lost sales; many
public employee strikes save employers money because no sales are lost but payroll is reduced.
The difference makes inopposite arguments for use of the traditional strike based upon private
analogy. Also, some argue, there is no "market" sanction in the public strike situation; but others
would argue that citizens weigh the costs of early settlement against the value of lost public ser-
vices and, indeed, choose through their representatives to purchase or forego public employees
services according to the value placed upon them. An example of a poor reason is: all public
employee services are essential (although some are pretty much the same as those provided in
other places by private employees who are permitted to strike).
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The strike, it must be understood, disciplines both sides.2 Employees
lose wages and the employer loses production, and sales, and sometimes
customers. Before either side precipitates a strike it must weigh such losses
against the cost of agreement. If both sides run risks of substantial loss,
they feel pressure toward settling on terms that also serve the needs of the
other.' It is not an actual strike that makes bargaining proceed reason-
ably; indeed, strikes in the private sector are rare.4  Rather it is the pos-
sibility of a strike and its attendant hazards that keep the demands and re-
sponses of both sides within bounds.'
In all but three states statutes or court decisions ban public employee
strikes. That state of affairs probably will persist for a considerable peri-
od into the future. Whether the reasons are good or bad,( the common
disapproval of public employee strikes must be taken as given. Another
given is that the ban does not work, even in sectors where those who now
strike, notably school teachers, regarded the device as unthinkable in the
not-so-recent past. They, and other public employees, use the device be-
cause they have seen it work in the private sector and believe that they pos-
sess no other method to attain employer recognition and responsive bar-
gaining-with or without statutes requiring bargaining. Whether that
employee and union perception is accurate or not, it is a fact of life, which
imprisonment and fines-actual or threatened-seem unable to change.
Quite a few disinterested observers, myself included, agree that without
some sanction to fill the strike's role, many public employers, especially
the uninitiate, will not bargain responsively.
What is needed, then, is a device or devices which serve the beneficial
purposes of the strike (make bargaining "go") but lack its baleful char-
acteristics-extensive disruption, undue' hardship to non-contestants, and
-not least-is acceptable enough to the community to be made legal.
This is the ideal situation, to which there are exceptions. For example, a strike will not
deter an employer with ample stocks not vulnerable to picketing ox union members with ample
alternative employment opportunities.
3 Frequently concessions on different subjects are sought by union and employer. To take an
example I have observed, an employer conceded a guarantee of job security in trade for union
agreement to relax craft jurisdictional lines. Note that the value of both concessions would be
very difficult to estimate - bargaining often is rough and ready.
4 In 1968, 5,045 work stoppages accounted for .28 percent of total working time. U.S.
BUREA U OF LABOR STATIsTICS, D]P'T. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1646, ANALYSIS OF WoRK
STOPPAGBS, 1968, at 13 (1970).
Many believe that the absence of such strike-imposed constraints contributed to the break-
down of bargaining in the railroad industry where, until the recent past, strikes were nationwide
in scope and hence not tolerated although not legally prohibited as a general rule.
6 Many academic labor relations specialists believe that public employee strikes will become
more acceptable and, eventually, legal as some are in Hawaii and Pennsylvania. That may very
well be. My own view is that the strike is an overly blunt weapon ;n both sectors, but especially
in the public realm. I am not avid for banning it in either area. My concern is to develop
more satisfactory devices for all concerned. Ideally, such substitutes would be so preferable
that banning the traditional strike simply would not be a matter for consideration,
" Of course, what is "responsive" or "undue" depends upon value judgments. By "unto-
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Such devices are needed at least equally in higher education where col-
lective bargaining takes place. The strike device is unacceptable to many
professors, administrators, students, officials and the public at large, even
in bargaining with private universities and colleges subject to the National
Labor Relations Act which affirmatively protects the right to strike. In
this traditionally calmer realm, the winds of militance have begun to waft,
intensified by tight and reduced budgets and resultant anxiety about job
security.
II. ALTERNATIVES TO THE STRIKE
Alternatives to the strike have been actively sought. Quite a few pub-
lic employee statutes offer protection against management unfair labor
practices, mandatory recognition of and bargaining with unions represent-
ing majorities, machinery for establishing majority status, mandatory medi-
ation of bargaining disputes, and mandatory fact-finding by neutrals with
recommendations designed to mobilize public support for the settlement
determined in that procedure. While such devices do reduce strikes, partic-
ularly over recognition, employees and unions feel they can do as much
and more with the strike. Indeed, enactment of such statutes frequently
results from strikes. Employees and unions feel that even recognition un-
der such statutes frequently is hollow because the public managers, from
habit and the pressure of costs and citizen resistance to tax increases, will
not bargain meaningfully. Useful though the described devices are, they
are not substitutes for the strike and in the absence of strike-like pressure,
do not work at full effectiveness.
So, proposals have been made to provide a strike substitute in the sense
of a device to terminate dispute or in the sense of a goad to effective bar-
gaining. A brief description may help the uninitiate.
A. Arbitration
Voluntary use of industrial arbitration has spread rapidly since World
War II, largely without aid from the law. Its phenomenal growth and
acceptance have been utterly remarkable in a period when distrust and crit-
icism dog most institutional arrangements. For the most part this success
story attaches to determination of grievances involving the interpretation
of provisions in existing collective bargaining agreements. The device has
been little used to resolve disputes over what those contract terms should
sponsive" bargaining I do not mean conduct so blatant as to violate the legally imposed obliga.
tion to bargain in good faith. Rather, I mean bargaining with less desire to achieve agreement
than is common among private employers faced with a union that has the right to strike. "Un-
due" hardship means difficulties disproportionate to the responsibility and opportunity of the
afflicted person's role to bring about a settlement and whose interest in the outcome may be
mobilized adequately by less extreme means.
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be.' In contract interpretation disputes, the parties voluntarily agree to
the process and select the arbitrators or at least decide the method of their
selection. Compulsory arbitration for new contract terms imposes both
the process and the arbiters and, to pass constitutional muster, standards of
decisions, although they tend to be quite approximate.
Nonetheless, compulsory arbitration of new contract terms when ne-
gotiations deadlock continues to be proposed as a means of averting dis-
ruptions in production or services regarded as unacceptable. In the fairly
recent past, Congress twice has forbidden stoppages and decreed compul-
sory arbitration where nationwide railroad strikes impended. In 1972, it
came close to another such enactment, but with notable reluctance.
Whether a device succeeds or fails, helps or hinders, when applied to the
tangled labor relations of this distressed industry probably tells little about
its utility elsewhere.
Prescribing meaningful standards, finding neutrals knowledgeable in
the financial aspects of the institutions concerned, and translating pay
awards beyond budgetary limits into actuality constitute only the most ob-
vious difficulties of the compulsory arbitration regime.
Nor does experience under several state statutes mandating arbitration
of contract-making disputes in local public utilities' or by declaration of the
War Labor Board during World War 1110 persuade that such an approach
is promising.
Yet so many factors in state and local public employment and higher
education differ from these earlier situations that arbitration's potential in
these new settings cannot be readily assayed. Experience may evolve adap-
tations not now foreseen or demonstrate that the anticipated difficulties are
manageable and, in any event, less forbidding than the consequences of
strikes. While I myself am not sanguine, I would rather assess fresh expe-
rience than continue to haggle over the debatable lessons to be drawn from
stale examples with quite different attributes.
8 Richard U. Miller, Arbitration of New Contract Wage Disputer: Some Recent Trends, 20
IND. & LAB. REL REV. 250 (1967).
9 The opinions of responsible spokesmen for industry and labor, which emerged from
these consultations, show substantial unanimity of opposition to the statute on the
ground that it weakens the vitality of the collective bargaining process by making
agreements between labor and management more difficult to reach. (The two pub.
lished studies of the statute resulted in similar conclusions .... )
REPORT OF THE [New Jersey] GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON LEGISLATION RELATING TO
PUBLIC UTILITY LABOR DISPUTES (1954), excerpted in M. BERNSTEIN, PRIVATE DISPUTE
SETTEMNT 680 (1969).
10 "Experience, particularly the War Labor Board experience during the forties, confirms
that a statutory requirement... [for] arbitration has a narcotic effect on private bargainers...
WILLARD WIRTz, LABOR AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 52 (1964).
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B. Choice of Last Best Offers--t Either-Or" Arbitration
"Either-Or Arbitration," advanced by Carl Stevens' 1 and proposed by
President Nixon in his now-abandoned emergency dispute proposals, dif-
fers importantly from "normal" compulsory arbitration. In the "normal"
version the parties argue their respective positions and seek to buttress it
with data; the arbitrators appointed by the public authorities can choose
either position or some intermediate point, the usual outcome. But under
the "either-or" formula the parties would present the best offer they want
to make and the arbiters must choose the one that is most "reasonable."
By ruling out a compromise award, parties arguably face pressure to make
the most appealing proposal rather than the inflated proposals common in
normal contract-term arbitration offered in the expectation of scaling down
by the arbiters. Thus, it is urged, bargaining will be more realistic and the
parties will come closer to making acceptable proposals.
But objections abound: bargainers may indulge in brinksmanship; the
arbiters will not be able to reject unpalatable parts of proposals; the results
will be less realistic than now achieved by the "compromise" technique.
But no one knows.
C. The Non-Stoppage and Partial Strike ' 2
I have proposed that two related devices-the non-stoppage strike and
the graduated strike-be prescribed by law. When a union and public
employer bargain to impasse and exhaust mediation and fact-finding, a
union could declare a "non-stoppage strike;" employees would continue
to do all of their work-but, initially, lose ten percent of their take-home
pay. This and an equal amount contributed by the employer would go into
a Public Purposes Fund controlled by a labor-management-public board
(with non-officials in the majority) to apply the amounts to unbudgeted
public purposes. If the dispute continued, the union could elect to increase
the amounts by ten percent increments. These amounts would put pres-
sure on the immediate parties to bargain responsively; those parties and
the amounts involved would put pressure on other more remote public of-
ficials to decide budget and appropriation issues pertinent to the dispute.
The device provides sufficient time for the pressure to spread to those of-
ficials who must become involved.
If after a specified period the non-stoppage strike does not work, a grad-
uated strike would be authorized. An actual stoppage would be permis-
sible, but only for a portion of the week-initially one-half day a week
1 C. Stevens, Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible with Bargaining?, 5 IND. REL. 38
(1966). Neal Chamberlain says that it had a brief vogue under the Weimar Republic, where
it failed. N. CHAmBERLAw, THE LAOR SECOR 640-41 (1965).
1 2 For a fuller description and assessment consult Bernstein, Alternatives in the Strike in
Public Labor Relations, 85 HARV. L. REV. 459 (1971).
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with additional half days addable at specified intervals. (Or, an agency
could convert a non-stoppage strike into an actual strike of equal degree
whenever it could not afford the non-stoppage version.) Again gradual
and potentially growing pressure would now more directly involve the cit-
izen-taxpayer (the actual employer). Citizen involvement would stimu-
late official action. The taste of deprivation, without the bitterness of a
total stoppage, might make larger allocations or higher taxes possible.
With an actual though partial stoppage operating, political decisions would
be more realistic than now; and officials would be spared the dilemma of
bargaining under "illegal coercion" or blinking at the illegality. In a so-
ciety where disrespect for law has become a major problem, substituting
enforcible for non-enforcible law is desirable.
III. THE NEED FOR EXPERIMENTATION
Faculty and administration in higher education may play a special role
in exploring new methods of dispute resolution. Open-mindedness to new
ideas, an inquiring turn of mind, attachment for rational processes, habits
of experimentation, and respect for prescribed regulations peculiarly fit
them to play a special pioneering role in testing new procedures.
For experimentation is needed. While debate may not have taken us
quite as far as it can, further explication of proposed procedures probably
will not suffice to persuade legislators to enact them. The factual basis for
the arguments for and against particular schemes is sketchy at best.13 So,
for example, adverse assessments of compulsory arbitration (which I too
have used) date back to World War II and the early 1950's, to say noth-
ing of the fact that they involve, in one case, wartime experience among
generally inexperienced bargainers, and, in the other, local public utilities.
Whether one can generalize about them almost a generation later, can only
be doubted. Two other more recent incidents in the railroad industry in-
volve complexities and peculiarities that make evaluation terribly difficult,
to put it mildly.
Moreover, experience teaches that union and employer arrangements,
habits and conventions, economic conditions, and-not least-personalities
to be found in bargaining relationships can vary enormously. Therefore
it would be astonishing if one prescription for averting strikes worked
equally well in so many variant situations, Some devices-such as media-
tion and fact-finding-in the hands of sensitive experts readily adapt to the
peculiarities of particular situations. They are-or, in my judgment, should
be-standard features in any statute or, indeed, private efforts to resolve
difficult disputes where the parties unaided cannot do so.
13 Some data will soon be published about the results of some procedures, e.g., Michigan's
fact-finding. The applicability of such experience, especially in the public sector, to other set-
tings is at least open to question. Michigan's decades of experience with organized labor in
the private sector and its impact upon elected officials find few parallels elsewhere.
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But wariness about the adaptability of other methods with significant
elements of coercion to all public employment or all higher education
seems warranted. What works for police may foul out with teachers.
And the arrangements and traditions of public school teachers differ in so
many significant ways from those in colleges and universities (and, there
are universities and universities) that equal success or failure for a partic-
ular dispute resolution technique at both sets of institutions seems unlike-
ly.
So it would seem wise to test out a variety of devices in actual practice.
Legislators, unions, public management and educational administrators
will not, I have found, readily embrace a new procedure based on argumen-
tation alone. Experience must be produced. But given the reluctance to
enact procedures of general application, the need is for small scale experi-
mentation with procedures that are most acceptable to the parties involved.
Practice may tell which arrangements best fit particular kinds of institu-
tions.
Perhaps plausible generalizations from such experience cannot be
achieved; that is, too many variables spoil the correlations. But, without
such limited experimentation the outlook for broader scale innovation
seems poor.
In the public sector what is needed is legislation authorizing public
bodies to enter into strike avoidance arrangements by contract for limited
periods. (Whether experience developed under such voluntary arrange-
ment will be transferable to a mandated scheme is an argument to be
crossed later.) In private higher education, faculty representatives and
administrators ought to recognize their special competence to test out new
devices that go beyond the strike and that fit the special needs of educa-
tional institutions.
Would employers agree to such arrangements? One cannot be sure.
In private higher education strikes are permissible but not likely, although
some have occurred and been threatened. Whether or not fears of strikes
will impel university administrators to negotiate effective strike substitutes
is uncertain. The need for effective dispute resolution machinery in institu-
tions with collegial traditions probably will be felt when the new pres-
sures of bargaining come into play. Paradoxically in the public realm,
where strikes are prohibited, apprehension of strikes provides a potent mo-
tivation to employers to seek new methods that provide better protection
than bans.
Officials will not readily place their bets on legislation mandating any
strike substitute-and cannot be expected to do so until the entrants, which
are made to sound so spirited and promising in print, have a track record.
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